Showing posts with label linguistics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label linguistics. Show all posts

Saturday, August 31, 2013

reading: You Are What You Speak

I just recently read You Are What You Speak by Robert Lane Greene. I can heartily recommend it as an enjoyable read, although it's aimed at a fairly general audience.

Greene covers, briefly, all kinds of things: the diversity of languages in the world, what it means to have a language, the identity politics of speaking a particular language, attempts at regulating language and how they relate to nationalism. He spends a lot of time on the history of prescriptive rules for English -- think style books like Eats, Shoots and Leaves and The Elements of Style and their historical predecessors. There's also discussion on the associated hand-wringing, class issues and emotional damage inflicted by telling people that their native dialect isn't the real way to speak a given language.

So You Are What You Speak would be a good introduction to the question of "what is a linguist? what is linguistics?" for your friend who internalized the watchful eye of your high school English teacher and yells at people about their grammar and diction on the Internet. If anything, I think Greene gives too much credit to language prescriptivists by suggesting that there is some kind of meaningful debate going on between sticklers and, y'know, scientists trying to describe language in the world.

I would have liked to see more examples from outside the Western-European world. Greene spends most of the book talking about English and French, with some bits about the Brazilian Portuguese language academy (which I didn't know was a thing). Come to think of it, more concrete examples about the socio-politics of different English dialects would have been good too. But it's not that long of a book.

So if you've been hanging out in a Linguistics department -- or just reading Language Log -- and laugh when people despair loudly that kids these days are destroying the English language, you may not need to read this book. But you might want to give it to your relatives.

Sunday, June 23, 2013

NAACL 2013 review

Just recently, I was in Atlanta for NAACL. So much fun! The hallway track is always the best -- I saw a bunch of friends from the NLP world, and especially a lot of Googlers, and met a bunch of new people! Also I managed to be present for Ray Mooney and David Forsyth and some other professors disagreeing animatedly about internal representations of meaning and to what extent you need to take the intentional stance with respect to other people.

Lots of really interesting papers this time around. There is of course Hal Daumé's expert opinion about the interesting papers at the main conference -- I saw a lot of those same talks, having mostly been hanging out at the machine translation and syntax/parsing tracks. On a personal note, it's exciting to see people I know and have worked with getting mentions on Hal's blog! (so, congratulations Greg Durrett and John DeNero and Juri Ganitkevitch!)

Additionally, here's what I thought was cool:
  • Training Parsers on Incompatible Treebanks by Richard Johansson. You want to build a parser for your language. And you've got a treebank. No! You've got two treebanks. Even better, right? But what if those two treebanks use entirely different annotation schemes? ...
  • In the invited talk on Wednesday, Kathy McKeown talked about, among other things, the idea that as NLP people we can provide evidence for or against ideas in comparative literature or literary theory, in collaboration with literature folks -- "well, the theory is that narrative works like this -- let's check!"
  • At *Sem, but also in the main conference, people are talking about using richer, more structured semantic models in our applications again. The really major change in the field in the early 1990s was to not do this -- but now we've got bigger computers and more data, and as a community we know a lot more about stats! Kevin Knight and his group are launching their Abstract Meaning Representation project ("It's like a treebank, but for semantics.") -- maybe it'll work this time!
  • Also at *Sem, Yoav Goldberg talked about the unreasonably enormous Syntactic Ngrams dataset -- it's basically chunks of parse trees from the English part of the Google Books corpus, indexed by time. That's going to be super useful.
  • I popped in to some of the Computational Linguistics for Literature talks -- Mark Riedl's invited talk about programmatically generating stories for games (slides) was especially good!
  • SemEval! There were fourteen different tasks -- lots of different aspects of understanding text! And people are using all these wildly different techniques to do it. An introductory talk about a task and then a single presentation about a system for performing that task is not always enough to really understand the problem, though...
  • I think my presentation went pretty well! People I've been citing for a while were at my talk, and people seemed engaged and asked good questions! (slides, paper)
Alright! So now, full of encouragement and ideas -- back to work.

Sunday, June 05, 2011

Mr. Verb on metaphor

Oh, also: there was this great Mr. Verb post, where they talk about government funding to do research on metaphor. Link to an article in The Atlantic: Why Are Spy Researchers Building a 'Metaphor Program'?

Here's the job posting, which sounds awesome, except that it will probably ultimately lead to people getting exploded:
The Metaphor Program will exploit the fact that metaphors are pervasive in everyday talk and reveal the underlying beliefs and worldviews of members of a culture. In the first phase of the two-phase program, performers will develop automated tools and techniques for recognizing, defining and categorizing linguistic metaphors associated with target concepts and found in large amounts of native-language text. The resulting conceptual metaphors will be validated using empirical social science methods. In the second phase, the program will characterize differing cultural perspectives associated with case studies of the types of interest to the Intelligence Community. Performers will apply the methodology established in the first phase and will identify the conceptual metaphors used by the various protagonists, organizing and structuring them to reveal the contrastive stances.

Metaphors We Live By

I just finished reading Lakoff and Johnson's Metaphors We Live By. The most central claim of the book is that metaphor isn't just about language, but that it's a core part of cognition, and that a great deal of our experience is shaped by the metaphors that we use to understand the world.

The authors talk a few times about how we understand love: is it more like a journey, or more like a collaborative work of art? Is a marriage like a partnership, or like a haven from the outside world? One's way of thinking about either of these things probably has a direct effect on experience and behavior.

I'm left with some questions, though, and maybe you've got insights that you'd like to share. In the later chapters, the authors go on to say that understanding metaphor this way requires rethinking a lot of philosophy, particularly what it means to say that a sentence is true. I don't know enough about philosophy-of-language to say whether it's actually been shaken to its core (philosophy is a physical structure), but fairly common sentences like "she's a cool drink of water" (attractive person is refreshing), "he threw in the towel" (this situation is a boxing match and he gave up) or even "I see what you mean" (knowing/understanding is seeing) seem pretty hard to represent in propositional logic.

I think I buy the argument that establishing their truth or falsity is possible only if you understand the metaphor that the speaker is using -- but it's a very typical case, that the speaker is using some metaphor or another. It's nearly impossible to speak or reason without using metaphors (similarity is physical closeness), so maybe in general a good theory of meaning really does have to take this into account.

Is there a point at which a metaphor becomes an honestly frozen form, though? What happens if you learn an expression without knowing its etymology, and just say it because it's that kind of situation? You learn a classifier for "throw in the towel" situations, and say it appropriately, but maybe you don't know anything about boxing. I'll start watching for this sort of situation: maybe it happens a lot.

Also, do Lakoff and Johnson essentially agree or disagree with Doug Hofstadter, who says that analogy is the core of cognition? (the video of Doug's talk is totally worth watching).

I'll probably read some of the more recent work on this: More than Cool Reason (metaphor in poetry), and Moral Politics (metaphor in reasoning about politics) both sound really interesting, possibly even relevant to the real world.

Saturday, February 05, 2011

Machine of Death Remix Corpus!

Machine of Death is fantastic. And it turns out that most of the stories in Machine of Death allow derivative works...

And when I hear "derivative works", I think the word "remix". But what's a remix of a text? Cut-up poetry? n-gram models to generate ominous-sounding emails to your family? Counting how many times the word "of" appears? The original text, but with randomized capitalization? This is for you to decide. Well, it is now. Here's all the derivs-allowed stories, conveniently pulled out and converted to ASCII.

Machine of Death Remix Corpus.

Use this to train your poetry bot, or your story understanding system, or your unexpected other thing! Share and enjoy :)

Saturday, November 27, 2010

"What a good blog post this is."

You don't happen to know what this phenomenon is called, do you? I've been looking around, and haven't managed to Google it yet.

(1) What a tall guy he is.
(2) I just realized what a tall guy he is.

That's definitely not the same thing as the question word being in front and, say, being the object of the verb...
(3) What did the dog knock over?

You can't rearrange (1) such that the "what" goes away.
(4) * He is what a tall guy.

If you were going to draw a parse tree, what would it look like? Surely a lot of ink has been spilled about it? I don't even know what it's called for sure. Something like a "wh-exclamatory statement"?

Saturday, October 23, 2010

extended abstract for a workshop, MTMRL

On Wednesday, I submitted a mini-writeup of my project this semester to the Machine Translation and Morphologically-rich Languages workshop. My code definitely isn't in a useful state yet, but they say that works-in-progress are OK.

I'll let you know if my project gets accepted. The workshop is in Israel, which would be a really interesting place to visit!

Here's what I wrote:

Abstract
Here we describe a work-in-progress approach for learning valencies of verbs in a morphologically rich language using only a morphological analyzer and an unannotated corpus. We will compare the results from applying this approach to an unannotated Arabic corpus with those achieved by processing the same text in treebank form. The approach will then be applied to an unannotated corpus from Quechua, a morphologically rich but resource-scarce language.
See the rest here; it's short! (or as a pdf)

Just in case you're not familiar with the idea of valency for verbs: wikipedia!

Wednesday, September 22, 2010

apparently you're wrong about what's grammatical in your language

From Liliane Haegeman's Introduction to Government and Binding Theory.
7e. Once that [that Bill had left] was clear, we gave up.

The sentence is odd for most native speakers: it is not acceptable. However, this sentence is formed according to the same principle that we posited to account for the formation of (7b)-(7d), i.e., that one sentence may become part of another sentence. Hence (7e) would be grammatical, though it is not acceptable.

Faced with intuitions such as that for (7e) the linguist might decide to modify the grammar he has formulated in such a way that sentence (7e) is considered to be ungrammatical. He may also decide, however, that (7e) is grammatical, and that the unacceptability of the sentence is due to independent reasons. For instance, (7e) may be argued to be unacceptable because the sentence is hard to process. In the latter case the unacceptability is not strictly due to linguistic factors but is due to the more general mechanisms used for processing information.

The native speaker who judges a sentence cannot decide whether it is grammatical. He only has intuitions about acceptability. It is for the linguist to determine whether the unacceptability of a sentence is due to grammatical principles or whether it may be due to other factors. It is the linguist's task to determine what makes (7e) unacceptable.
As a linguist, I'm going to tell you that your naïve intuition that this sentence is ungrammatical is just because you're not smart enough to process the grammatical rules that you know subconsciously -- rules that are in fact mostly encoded in your DNA. What?

Seriously: I'd posit that, if your theory about a language doesn't account for what actual native speakers count as a valid sentence, then your theory is wrong! Is Haegeman representing the general Chomskyan position correctly here?

Our goal as scientists is to account for what happens observably. In what way does a proposed grammar of a language count as a falsifiable scientific theory if you can just say "in reality, that sentence is grammatical -- there were just processing difficulties"?

Monday, August 23, 2010

Don't Sleep, There Are Snakes

I just recently finished reading Don't Sleep, There Are Snakes by Dan Everett; it's about the Pirahã people of the Amazon, and the years that he spent with them, originally as a missionary, but then as a linguist.

Everett has great stories to tell, and his telling of them is exciting -- moving to a tiny riverside village in the middle of the jungles of Brazil, with your family, sounds crazy. I can't imagine bringing small children into the rain forest...

His descriptions of the Pirahã culture and language are also fantastic; the Pirahã people only really want to talk about things they've experienced directly, and are largely uninterested in ideas and techniques from the outside world. It's basically not done for them to talk about things that no living Pirahã has seen. They don't appear to have a creation myth of their own, and aren't very much into creation myths that missionaries might have to offer.

And the language has all of these wild properties: most notably, it doesn't seem to feature arbitrary-depth recursion, so its modifiers don't stack, there aren't dependent clauses, and apparently the language doesn't have conjunctions at all. Also it can apparently be whistled or hummed, and it has evidentiality.

The whistle-ability and evidentiality aren't unknown among the world's languages; they just seem strange relative to most of us. The lack of recursion, though, throws into doubt a lot of what we think is inherent and unique in human language. Everett's claims have apparently caused a nontrivial amount of ink and vitriol to be spilled; he's been personally called a charlatan by Chomsky (according to wikipedia).

So, altogether: I enjoyed reading it quite a lot. Everett writes compellingly about his (and his family's) adventures trying to live in the rain forest, about the Pirahã people, about language and cognition and culture, and about his losing his faith gradually, on being confronted with a people who aren't much into abstractions or things that happened centuries ago -- and in fact don't talk about them.

Tuesday, May 18, 2010

the literature: Realization with CCG

My "Alternative Syntactic Theories" class this semester was pretty interesting. I'd only spent so much time thinking about the difficulties that you face when trying to come up with a good formalism for describing the syntax of human languages. It's a big hairy problem! So this was a good exercise for me.

For my project for the class, I read a bunch of papers by the great Michael White about the work that he and his colleagues have been doing on realization (aka generating text) with OpenCCG.

If you're interested in CCG, text generation, or text generation with CCG...
- Here are my presentation slides
- and here's my writeup about it: html, pdf.

Tuesday, April 13, 2010

my dialect and subjunctive verbs

I got corrected on subjunctive verb usage today, which I found odd enough to blog about.

My utterance was something like: "If it was..." -- and I got interrupted with "if it were". My immediate response: "My dialect doesn't do that."

Rudeness aside, what would you say, and under what circumstances? What are the odds, do you think, that my interlocutor has the "if I be..." construction?

Sunday, February 21, 2010

Morphology: derivation and inflection

Morphology is the study of the structure of words, and the processes by which they're produced. Within morphology, we talk about (among other things), derivation and inflection. It took a little bit of reading for me to understand the difference between the two, so hopefully I can explain it to you.

Derivation is when new words, typically of a different part of speech, are produced from existing words. In English, we have quite a few affixes to change a word's the category, and interestingly, they're not very regular. To make something black, you blacken it, but to make something hollow, you hollow it. In Calvin and Hobbes, Calvin uses verb as a verb that means "turn something into a verb". To make something into a product, you can (recently) productize it. What word can you use to make something blue? Have you ever bluified something?

Inflection is rather simpler. It takes a base form of a word and encodes some extra meaning in it -- what extra meaning varies by language, but it's often things like plurality or gender. Typically the language requires that words be inflected properly.

Languages differ pretty broadly how much information a given inflected word carries. For example, a verb in Spanish carries more bits than one in English, so in Spanish ("Hablo castellano.") you often don't have to specify the subject of a verb, because its inflection makes it clear who you're talking about [0]. Some languages encode quite a lot of information in one verb: maybe its object, the whole tense (so no need for modal verbs like "would" or "haber"), the genders of all the participants, maybe even how the speaker came to know the information in question [1].

I have a whole lot of linguistics to learn. It's interesting being around a department where a lot of the people are linguists by background, when I've only put so much time and attention into it. So you'll get more posts like this, rest assured.



[0] This feature, of not having to specify pronouns, is called being a pro-drop language. Some languages can drop more pronouns than Spanish!

[1] This feature, grammatical evidentiality, is extremely awesome, and we need to adopt it in English.



References:
http://www.indiana.edu/~hlw/Derivation/intro.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inflectional_morphology
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evidentiality
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inflection#Inflection_vs._derivation
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pro-drop_language