Mr. Verb on metaphor

Oh, also: there was this great Mr. Verb post, where they talk about government funding to do research on metaphor. Link to an article in The Atlantic: Why Are Spy Researchers Building a 'Metaphor Program'?

Here's the job posting, which sounds awesome, except that it will probably ultimately lead to people getting exploded:

The Metaphor Program will exploit the fact that metaphors are pervasive in everyday talk and reveal the underlying beliefs and worldviews of members of a culture. In the first phase of the two-phase program, performers will develop automated tools and techniques for recognizing, defining and categorizing linguistic metaphors associated with target concepts and found in large amounts of native-language text. The resulting conceptual metaphors will be validated using empirical social science methods. In the second phase, the program will characterize differing cultural perspectives associated with case studies of the types of interest to the Intelligence Community. Performers will apply the methodology established in the first phase and will identify the conceptual metaphors used by the various protagonists, organizing and structuring them to reveal the contrastive stances.

Metaphors We Live By

I just finished reading Lakoff and Johnson's Metaphors We Live By. The most central claim of the book is that metaphor isn't just about language, but that it's a core part of cognition, and that a great deal of our experience is shaped by the metaphors that we use to understand the world.

The authors talk a few times about how we understand love: is it more like a journey, or more like a collaborative work of art? Is a marriage like a partnership, or like a haven from the outside world? One's way of thinking about either of these things probably has a direct effect on experience and behavior.

I'm left with some questions, though, and maybe you've got insights that you'd like to share. In the later chapters, the authors go on to say that understanding metaphor this way requires rethinking a lot of philosophy, particularly what it means to say that a sentence is true. I don't know enough about philosophy-of-language to say whether it's actually been shaken to its core (philosophy is a physical structure), but fairly common sentences like "she's a cool drink of water" (attractive person is refreshing), "he threw in the towel" (this situation is a boxing match and he gave up) or even "I see what you mean" (knowing/understanding is seeing) seem pretty hard to represent in propositional logic.

I think I buy the argument that establishing their truth or falsity is possible only if you understand the metaphor that the speaker is using -- but it's a very typical case, that the speaker is using some metaphor or another. It's nearly impossible to speak or reason without using metaphors (similarity is physical closeness), so maybe in general a good theory of meaning really does have to take this into account.

Is there a point at which a metaphor becomes an honestly frozen form, though? What happens if you learn an expression without knowing its etymology, and just say it because it's that kind of situation? You learn a classifier for "throw in the towel" situations, and say it appropriately, but maybe you don't know anything about boxing. I'll start watching for this sort of situation: maybe it happens a lot.

Also, do Lakoff and Johnson essentially agree or disagree with Doug Hofstadter, who says that analogy is the core of cognition? (the video of Doug's talk is totally worth watching).

I'll probably read some of the more recent work on this: More than Cool Reason (metaphor in poetry), and Moral Politics (metaphor in reasoning about politics) both sound really interesting, possibly even relevant to the real world.

apparently you're wrong about what's grammatical in your language

From Liliane Haegeman's Introduction to Government and Binding Theory.

7e. Once that [that Bill had left] was clear, we gave up.

The sentence is odd for most native speakers: it is not acceptable. However, this sentence is formed according to the same principle that we posited to account for the formation of (7b)-(7d), i.e., that one sentence may become part of another sentence. Hence (7e) would be grammatical, though it is not acceptable.

Faced with intuitions such as that for (7e) the linguist might decide to modify the grammar he has formulated in such a way that sentence (7e) is considered to be ungrammatical. He may also decide, however, that (7e) is grammatical, and that the unacceptability of the sentence is due to independent reasons. For instance, (7e) may be argued to be unacceptable because the sentence is hard to process. In the latter case the unacceptability is not strictly due to linguistic factors but is due to the more general mechanisms used for processing information.

The native speaker who judges a sentence cannot decide whether it is grammatical. He only has intuitions about acceptability. It is for the linguist to determine whether the unacceptability of a sentence is due to grammatical principles or whether it may be due to other factors. It is the linguist's task to determine what makes (7e) unacceptable.

As a linguist, I'm going to tell you that your naïve intuition that this sentence is ungrammatical is just because you're not smart enough to process the grammatical rules that you know subconsciously -- rules that are in fact mostly encoded in your DNA. What?

Seriously: I'd posit that, if your theory about a language doesn't account for what actual native speakers count as a valid sentence, then your theory is wrong! Is Haegeman representing the general Chomskyan position correctly here?

Our goal as scientists is to account for what happens observably. In what way does a proposed grammar of a language count as a falsifiable scientific theory if you can just say "in reality, that sentence is grammatical -- there were just processing difficulties"?

from Dan Dennett: "Preachers who are not Believers"

From a recent article by Dan Dennett and Linda LaScola, "Preachers who are not Believers", which I saw on the International Cognition and Culture Institute blog.

They managed to reach out and find some actual pastors of churches, who happen to not believe much of what their church-people probably expect they believe, and interview them. They turn out to be really thoughtful, compassionate people. With jobs that must be pretty difficult at times. Awesome paper.

From Jack, age 50, a Southern Baptist minister of 15 years:

“OK, this God created me. It’s a perfect God that knows everything; can do anything. And somehow it got messed up, and it’s my fault. So he had to send his son to die for me to fix it. And he does. And now I’m supposed to beat myself to death the rest of my life over it. It makes no sense to me. Don’t you think a God could come up with a better plan than that?”

“What kind of personality; what kind of being is this that had to create these other beings to worship and tell him how wonderful he is? That makes no sense, if this God is all-knowing and all-wise and all-wonderful. I can’t comprehend that that’s what kind of person God is.”

“Every church I’ve been in preached that the Jonah in the Whale story is literally true. And I’ve never believed that. You mean to tell me a human was in the belly of that whale? For three days? And then the whale spit him out on the shoreline? And, of course, their convenient logic is, ‘Well, God can do anything.’”

“Well, I think most Christians have to be in a state of denial to read the Bible and believe it. Because there are so many contradicting stories. You’re encouraged to be violent on one page, and you’re encouraged to give sacrificial love on another page. You’re encouraged to bash a baby’s head on one page, and there’s other pages that say, you know, give your brother your fair share of everything you have if they ask for it.”

“But if God was going to reveal himself to us, don’t you think it would be in a way that we wouldn’t question? ...I mean, if I was wanting to have...people teach about the Bible...I would probably make sure they knew I existed. ...I mean, I wouldn’t send them mysterious notes, encrypted in a way that it took a linguist to figure out.”

brains 'n' balancing training data

- Martin points us to a nice article over on Developing Intelligence: 10 Important Differences Between Brains and Computers. Your computational metaphor just breaks down eventually, y'know? The brain is not very much like a Von Neumann computer. It's a lot squishier.

If building classifiers is your thing, you may be interested to take a look at these articles:

- Gustavo E. A. P. A. Batista , Ana L. C. Bazzan, and Maria Carolina Monard: Balancing Training Data for Automated Annotation of Keywords: a Case Study.
Three researchers, seven middle names, one novel technique for building balanced data sets out of unbalanced ones for training classifiers: generate new instances of your minority class by interpolating between examples actually in your dataset. I'm still trying to decide whether this approach should work for the general case -- does it make too many assumptions about the shape of the space? Particularly: can you arbitrarily draw lines (in higher-dimensional space) between positive instances? What if there are negative instances between those two? Which dimensions do you look at first, and how is this better than just adding some noise or weighting positive examples higher? (is that last option the same as simply counting them several times?)

- Foster Provost: Machine Learning from Imbalanced Data Sets 101.
A basic overview of the problem, examining the motivation for building classifiers at all and some different approaches to sampling. The award for Best Name Ever goes to Dr. Foster Provost.